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Abstract 
Quality assurance and labeling play an important and increasing role in firms’ marketing strategies. In 
almost all cases, a price incentive has been stressed as the major incentive for firms to participate in 
such schemes. We argue here that important non-price incentives for participation in quality labeling 
may exist, too. In German retailing, it can be observed that discount retailers are listing more and 
more foods with quality labels. Processors may then participate in voluntary quality labeling in order 
to enter the large and growing market of discount retailers. The price-premium versus the market-
entry hypothesis are analyzed theo-retically. We investigate then in an empirical hedonic pricing 
model for the German fruit juice market and for participation in the quality label of the Deutsche 
Landwirtschafts-Gesellschaft (DLG) which of the two hypotheses is consistent with the data. There is 
strong support for the market-entry hypothesis. 
Keywords: Labeling; price premium; market entry; fruit juice market; DLG award 
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1 Introduction 
Quality assurance and labeling play an important and increasing role in firms’ marketing 
strategies. Manufacturers utilize these tools in order to gain or to keep market shares on 
horizontally and vertically differentiated food markets. The labeling of foods may address a 
large number of intrinsic quality attributes valued by consumers. Those quality attributes 
refer to, e.g., food safety, nutrition, sensoric or organoleptic analyses, the value and function 
of a product or its production process. Food labels may also contain quality signals like the 
country or region of origin of a product or test results of quality assurance schemes with 
regard to, e.g., certification or traceability (CASWELL and ANDERS 2011, p. 475).  
In the recent literature, quality assurance and labeling have mainly been seen as instruments 
of product proliferation that may lead to a price premium and, consequently, to producer 
gains. The main emphasis has been placed on the measurement of consumers’ willingness to 
pay for quality attributes. It was elaborated that some willingness to pay does exist for 
quality attributes such as ecological (CRANFIELD, DEATON and SHELLIKERI 2009), GM-free (LUSK et 
al. 2006) or pesticide-free production (ROOSEN 1998) and health benefits in foods (MARETTE et 
al. 2010). Moreover, quality signals like the regional origin of specialty foods (LOUREIRO and 
MCCLUSKEY 2000) or third-party certification of production standards (JAHN, SCHRAMM and 
SPILLER 2005) are also associated with a positive willingness to pay. In an increasing number 
of studies, various quality attributes were introduced jointly and the differential marginal 
willingness to pay was quantified (WEST et al. 2002; GAO and SCHROEDER 2009; APRILE, CAPUTO 
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and NAYGA 2012). Consequently, the introduction of quality labels has been regarded as a 
marketing tool to raise prices and producer gains (FOTOPOULOS and KRYSTALLIS 2003).  
It has been widely ignored in this literature that price advantages are only one possible 
option for manufacturers to gain from increasing product quality and its labeling. Therefore, 
it will be analyzed in this paper what kind of incentives may drive firms in their decisions to 
participate in quality assurance and labeling. Two hypotheses will be formulated theo-
retically and it will be tested empirically for a highly differentiated food industry which one 
of these hypotheses is consistent with the data. The empirical analysis focuses on the 
German fruit juice market and on the incentives for firms to participate in a voluntary quality 
label, i.e. the DLG Label. The article is organized as follows.  
After the Introduction, a brief overview of major developments on the German fruit juice 
market will be provided in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, two theoretical hypotheses will be 
derived. The first hypothesis refers to the traditional view that a price premium is the major 
incentive for participation in quality labeling. According to the second and opposite hypo-
thesis, firms may gain mainly from non-price incentives of quality labels. In Section 4, a 
hedonic pricing model will be specified and, based on primary data collected for the German 
fruit juice market, is utilized for an assessment of the two alternative hypotheses. 
Conclusions will be drawn in Section 5. 
 
2 The German Fruit Juice Market: Market Development and Quality Labeling 
Some background information on the development and structure of the German fruit juice 
market and on voluntary quality labeling in that market will be provided first. 
 
2.1 Market Structure and Development 
On the German beverage market, which is characterized by a declining consumption of 
alcoholic beverages and a strongly increasing consumption of non-alcoholic beverages 
(BMELV, Table 311, various years), fruit juice has been a very interesting category for 
decades now. Although per-capita consumption fell somewhat, i.e. from 39.6 (1990) to 36.3 
(2010) liters per year and, thus, to 12.5 % of non-alcoholic beverage consumption, Germany 
has been the country with the highest per-capita consumption of fruit juice in the European 
Union. In the year 2010, the country was followed by Finland (31.2 liters per capita and 
year), Austria (28.7 liters) and the Netherlands (27.9 liters). Moreover, fruit juice is a typical 
high-value product in the beverage industry with a higher relative importance in value rather 
than in quantity terms. Orange juice (8.7 liters) and apple juice (8.1 liters) dominated in 2010 
– as in the last decades - the per-capita consumption of fruit juices in Germany, followed by 
different nectars. 
An essential feature of German retailing, that is also important for our analysis, is the high 
and increasing share of discounters. The major share of non-alcoholic beverages in Germany 
is distributed by discounters (GFK Consumer Scan), followed by large department stores 
(≥ 1,500 m2) and traditional retailers and supermarkets (≤ 1,499 m2). The discounters’ 
market share increased from 35.0 % in 2002 to 55.3 % in 2010, at the expense of all other 
types of retailers. The loss of market share was particularly strong for beverage retail 
markets with a decline from 17.4 % (2002) to 7.6 % (2010). 
 
2.2 Quality Labeling for Non-alcoholic Beverages in Germany 
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There are some major actors on the German fruit juice market and the names of those firms 
are well-established as quality signals and were shown to be associated with price premia 
(BROCKMEIER 1993, p. 181). Apart from the brands of major suppliers, quality labels provided 
by independent agencies represent important signals of fruit-juice quality. These quality 
labels seem to be of special importance for processors who are no market leaders and 
cannot afford to develop national brands but still produce high-quality goods. One of these 
labels is the DLG Label which will be analyzed in the quantitative analysis below. The DLG 
Label is based on a voluntary participation by individual firms in third-party quality control. 
The DLG Label is awarded by the German Agricultural Society (Deutsche Landwirtschafts-
Gesellschaft, DLG), an association founded in 1885 in order to promote technical and 
scientific progress. In the DLG Test Center Food, more than 27,000 foods are tested annually 
in DLG Quality Tests mainly according to sensory analysis. For several product groups, 
sensory analysis is complemented by “food preparation tests, inspections of the packaging 
and labeling, as well as chemical, microbiological and physical analyses in accredited 
laboratories” (DLG 2012, p. 4). DLG awards in Gold, Silver and Bronze are given annually to 
food products of superior quality. In two studies, the importance of such tests under the DLG 
label for beverage prices, have been analyzed in detail. WENZEL (2002) utilized unpublished 
background information of DLG tests such as chemical and sensory criteria in the 
explanation of prices for apple juice; she elaborated a rather strong effect of those indicators 
of objective juice quality on prices. SCHAMEL (2003) introduced the DLG awards directly in his 
hedonic price analysis for wine and detected statistically significant impacts of DLG awards 
as well as quality grades on wine prices. 
 
3 Theoretical Considerations: Price versus Non-price Incentives in Quality Assurance 
and Labeling 
The economic rationale for quality assurance and labeling schemes is based on quality 
uncertainty by consumers. Differentiated food markets are often characterized by an 
information asymmetry with regard to product quality between producers and consumers as 
the consumers’ information on product quality is incomplete. Therefore, quality assurance 
and labeling schemes may provide the needed information and/or quality signals which 
reduce consumers’ search costs. Quality assurance and labeling may thus raise consumers’ 
welfare. If they succeed to raise society’s welfare, too, they will be a useful tool to avoid 
market failure and to strengthen the functioning of the market mechanism (see, e.g., 
HERRMANN and TEUBER 2011). 
In the following analysis of private incentives to join quality assurance and labeling schemes, 
it is not this information-economic perspective that is in our focus. The self-interest of firms 
to participate in such schemes is our primary interest. 
We posit for the following analysis that a firm produces a high-quality product already. Many 
consumers, however, will not be able to distinguish the high-quality product from a lower-
quality mass product. Given this background, there could be at least two motivations for a 
firm to participate in a voluntary labeling scheme which causes additional costs: 
 
1. The firm can be interested in the price premium it could get in the situation with a 
certified quality label compared to the non-labeled market. We call this the price-
premium hypothesis for a participation in the quality labeling scheme. 
2. The firm can be interested in the label, too, since retailing firms expect from their 
processors that their products are quality-labeled. If a quality label allows the firm to be 
listed with its product by retailers and to enter a larger market, the firm’s decision to 
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participate in the labeling scheme may raise profits even without a price premium. It is 
possible that larger quantities can be sold on a continuous basis. We call this the market-
entry hypothesis for the participation in the labeling scheme. 
 
The first hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose that the firm initially faces the demand 
curve D1 for its already existing high-quality product. The firm’s supply curve is S1, i.e. 
marginal costs are rising. If the firm sells on a competitive market, the equilibrium price is p1 
at which the firm sells quantity q1. Producer surplus is equal to area (a + b). Participation in 
quality labeling would help consumers to better identify the high-quality product and 
demand would shift to the right, from D1 to D2. Quality labeling would induce additional 
costs, too. Even if the high quality was introduced in the past and no additional costs of 
production and quality assurance occur, there will be costs for quality control by the 
certification agency. Additionally, there will be marketing costs due to a new package design 
with the quality label. Thus, marginal costs are raised and the supply curve shifts to the left - 
from S1 to S2. This yields a new market price p2 at which the supply curve S2 and the 
demand curve D2 intersect. For the individual firm, p2 is a gross price from which the 
marginal costs of quality labeling have to be deducted in order to get the net price p’2. As far 
as the label-induced shift of the demand curve is stronger than the supply shift, the 
individual firm receives an increasing net price. The net price after participation in the 
quality-labeling scheme has to be compared with the initial price in the non-labeling 
situation. In Figure 1, the firm gains in terms of producer surplus the area (c + d + e) due to 
participation in the quality-labeling scheme. 
It is this incentive that has been stressed in the literature many times. Most notably, 
DESENICU et al. (2011) survey 16 studies in which price premia for geographical indications in 
food products were computed. The authors regard the price premium, compared to a 
generic reference product, as a success indicator for geographical indications. They estimate 
in a meta-study which determinants affect the price premium and to what extent. 
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Figure 1.  The Price Incentive for Participation in Quality Assurance and Labeling (Hypothesis 1) 
 Source: Own presentation. 
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The second hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 2. A situation is shown in Figure 2 in which a 
firm might gain from entry to a large market with a quality label even if its price premium 
would become negative. We posit that the firm originally produced and marketed a high-
quality product already, but without a certified quality label. In this case, there was a 
situation of monopolistic competition for the firm. It was possible to sell the high-quality 
good at a price above the mass-market price, but associated with high search costs of 
consumers and a very small market for its product. According to Figure 2, the firm faced a 
demand curve D1 for the high-quality product with an associated marginal revenue curve 
MR1. Under profit maximization and with marginal costs MC1, the optimum quantity was q1. 
According to the COURNOT point C, the firm realized the price p1 for q1 under monopolistic 
competition. The optimum solution was associated with a producer surplus of area 
(a+b+c+d), i.e. the difference between earnings (a+b+c+d+e) minus variable costs (area e). 
A participation in the quality-labeling scheme may now be the entrance ticket to a large-
volume market for the high-quality product, if retailers ask for quality-labeled products from 
the processors. The growing German market of discount retailers is a case in point. Suppose 
that D2 is the retailers’ demand function for the firm’s high-quality product with a quality 
label. As price competition will be much stronger on the large-volume market, we posit that 
the firm can no longer set its price above marginal costs. With a certified quality label, the 
firm can move from its market niche and the demand curve D1 to the large-volume market 
of discounters with retailers’ market demand D2. Under competitive pricing, the firm may 
sell q2 where its new marginal cost curve MC2 intersects the retailers’ demand curve D2 for 
the firm’s product. The price consumers pay is p2. The producer price for the firm’s product 
falls from p1 in the niche-market situation without quality label to the net price p’2 on the 
large-volume market where the quantity sold rises substantially, i.e. from q1 to q2. The firm’s 
net price is the consumer price on the market of discount retailers, i.e. p2, minus the 
marginal costs of participating in quality labeling. Producer surplus with a certified quality 
label is now as high as area (a+b+f+g+h) and the impact of the quality label on producer 
surplus is (a+b+f+g+h–a–b–c-d). Compared to the non-labeling situation, the firm 
experiences a welfare gain if the area (f+g+h) exceeds area (c+d). 
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Figure 2. A Nonprice Incentive for Participation in Quality Assurance and Labeling(Hypothesis 2) 
Source: Own presentation. 
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It is the strategy of discounters which makes the market-entry hypothesis a very plausible 
rationale for participation in voluntary certified labeling. 
We will now provide empirical evidence for the German fruit-juice market in order to test 
whether one of the two hypotheses seems compatible with the findings. 
 
4 Empirical Analysis: A Hedonic Pricing Model of the Quality-Price Linkage on the 
German Fruit Juice Market 
In this Section, hedonic pricing models on the influence of product characteristics on the 
price of fruit juices in Germany will be developed, estimated and interpreted. We start with 
the empirical model and explain then the data. Finally, we provide the econometric 
estimates and the economic interpretation of results. 
 
4.1 The Empirical Model 
The empirical model is based on hedonic price analysis. The theoretical basis of hedonic 
pricing models is a consumer theory along the lines of LANCASTER (1966). According to 
LANCASTER and other authors of characteristics models, the characteristics of products rather 
than their quantities enter consumers’ utility functions. This approach is consistent with 
differentiated product markets in which heterogeneous preferences of consumers are 
satisfied. When an additional product characteristic is added to a product this will affect 
consumers’ utilities, i.e. the demand side, and/or the marginal costs of providing the 
characteristic, i.e. the supply side. ROSEN (1974) stressed the supply-and-demand character 
of hedonic pricing models. On a competitive market, implicit prices of product characteristics 
are affected by their implications for demand and supply. In COSTANIGRO and MCCLUSKEY 
(2011), the methodological foundation of hedonic pricing models is presented, applications 
to food market analysis are surveyed and future challenges are elaborated.  
The basic hedonic price function is then a reduced-form model of the supply and demand for 
products with varying quality characteristics. The dependent variable, i.e. the price of a 
product i (pi) is linked, to product i’s characteristics zij with j = 1, …, n: 
(1) 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑧𝑖1, … , 𝑧𝑖𝑛). 
In the following empirical analysis, we specify the dependent variable in logarithms and 
introduce various groups of independent variables: 
 
𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼0 + �𝛼1𝑘 ⋅ 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑖𝑘 + �𝛼2𝑙 ∙ 𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑙 +
𝑙𝑘
�𝛼3𝑚 ⋅ 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑚 + 𝜀.
𝑚
 
The vector LABELik captures variables that indicate whether certain quality labels k are valid 
for product i. The vector QUALITYil stands for product characteristics l that describe a fruit 
juice i in terms of its objective or subjective quality. Variables which comprise the product’s 
distribution in the marketing chain as well as retailing strategies are covered under the 
vector CHAINim. Quite a number of variables, some of which are summarized in the 
Appendix , were used under these vectors during the specification search. 
The final models shown in Section 4.3 are based on estimations in which all coefficients were 
statistically significant at least at the 95 %-level. They are based on the following 
specification for apple juice: 
(3) 𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑖  = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ⋅ 𝐷𝐿𝐺_𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼2 ⋅ 𝑂𝑅𝐺𝐴𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑖 + 𝛼3 ⋅ 𝐵𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖 +
𝛼4𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼5 ∙ 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇_𝐽𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼6 ∙ 𝐺𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛼7 ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑈𝐷𝑌𝑖 + 𝛼8 ∙
𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼9 ∙ 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛼10 ∙ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 
and the following one for orange juice: 
(2)
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(4) 𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝐼  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝐷𝐿𝐺_𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐸𝐿𝐼 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑂𝑅𝐺𝐴𝑁𝐼𝐶𝐼 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝐵𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼 + 𝛽4 ⋅ln𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝐼 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇_𝐽𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐸𝐼 + 𝛽6 ∙ 𝐺𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼 + 𝛽7 ∙ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝐼 + 𝛽8 ∙
𝐵𝐸𝑉_𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼 +  𝜀𝐼 
pi (pI) is the price of apple juice i (orange juice I) with i = 238 (I = 182) in €/liter. The 
variables DLG_LABEL, ORGANIC and BRAND stand for the existence of a quality label – in the 
first two cases – and for the existence of a national brand in the latter case. For all three 
variables, the dummy variable becomes unity (zero) if the quality signal does exist (not 
exist). The signs of 𝛼1 and 𝛽1 indicate whether the price-premium or the market-entry 
hypothesis is consistent with the data. The higher 𝛼R1 and 𝛽1, the more likely is that the 
price-premium hypothesis holds. However, as we cannot observe equilibrium quantities, 
there is only one case where we can distinguish between the two hypotheses with certainty: 
𝛼R1 < 0 and 𝛽1 < 0 imply that the market-entry hypothesis is supported by the data. 
The variables PACKSIZE, DIRECT_JUICE, GLASS and CLOUDY belong to the vector QUALITY. 
They are indicators of objective or subjective fruit-juice quality. PACKSIZE, as a metric 
variable, measures the package size of a fruit juice sold. DIRECT_JUICE takes the value unity 
(zero) if fruit juice is processed from fresh fruit directly (from fruit concentrate). GLASS 
indicates that the package of the fruit juice is a glass bottle (another material than glass) if 
the variable is unity (zero). CLOUDY stands for a clouded (clear) apple juice if the value of the 
dummy variable is unity (zero). 
The variables REGDISTR, LARGECITY, UNIFORMPRICE and BEV_STORE are part of the vector 
CHAIN. They capture facts about how fruit juices are marketed by retailers and processors in 
the marketing chain. The dummy variables illustrate whether the processor of a fruit juice is 
distributing the fruit juice only regionally (REGDISTR=1) or nationwide (REGDISTR=0), 
whether the price observation comes from the larger city (LARGECITY=1) or the smaller city 
(LARGECITY=0), and whether the fruit was distributed by a beverage retail market 
(BEV_STORE=1) or not (BEV_STORE=0). In some cases, it was observed that some national 
brands were sold at the same or nearly the same price. The dummy variable UNIFORMPRICE 
received the value unity (zero) if this situation was given (not given). 
Apart from models (3) and (4), alternative model specifications will be presented in Section 
4.3 which refer to the detailed awards of the DLG Label rather than its existence. The 
variable DLG_LABEL in equations (3) and (4) will then be substituted by the awards GOLD, 
SILVER and BRONZE, respectively. 
 
4.2 Data 
Two primary data sets were collected and used in the following empirical analysis. Data refer 
to juices supplied in December 2010 in the retailing sector of two German cities: (i) Cologne 
and (ii) Baden-Baden. Cologne stands for larger and Baden-Baden for smaller West German 
cities. The study covered 182 juices offered in Cologne, namely 105 apple juices and 77 
orange juices, and 238 juices in Baden-Baden, namely 133 apple and 105 orange juices. For 
all juices sold, the following product characteristics were collected and incorporated: 
producer, brand, retailer, price, size and type of packaging, and quality labels. 
The individual juices were then assigned to DLG awards provided in three different editions 
of the magazine “DLG Test Lebensmittel”: 04/2008, 05/2009 and 05/2010. Older issues of 
the magazine which contained awards for fruit juices, too, were ignored as firms are allowed 
to advertise their DLG awards for 24 months only after its receipt. Thus, 145 fruit juices 
could be identified that had received a Gold, Silver or Bronze award under the DLG label. 
Among these were 88 apple and 57 orange juices. 
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Descriptive statistics of the sample of juices are summarized in the Appendix. 238 apple and 
182 orange juices are covered in the sample. There was a mean price of 1.29 €/liter for apple 
juice and 1.41 €/liter for orange juice. In some respects, the sample of apple juices is very 
similar to the sample of orange juices. In both cases, the private-label share of all juices was 
between 30 and 40 % and the share of national brands dominated. Moreover, the share of 
organic fruit juices was low compared to conventional ones. The conventional share was 
close to 90 % on both markets. Similar is also the share of products with DLG award: It 
ranges between 30 and 40 % for both apple and orange juice. 
A difference is that more regional suppliers are active on the market for apple juice (28.6 
compared to 17 %) and that glass packaging is clearly more important for apple juice (36.6 
compared to 26.4 %) compared to orange juice. Even stronger is the difference with regard 
to the role of direct juice: Its share is as high as 48.7 % for apple juice, but only 12.6 % for 
orange juice. This difference is plausible as high transport costs for oranges will lead to a 
stark cost advantage of processing orange juice from fruit concentrate rather than from 
fruits directly. For apple juice, the importance of the market segment of cloudy juice is 
visible (48.7 %). In the case of orange juice, there is an interesting market segment with fruit 
pulp, but it is rather small and covers only 6.6 % of all juices. 
 
4.3 Results and Interpretation 
The five selected estimations are presented in Table 1. In the first place, all estimations are 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 1 but consistent with Hypothesis 2. Apparently, the evidence 
supports the market-entry hypothesis. Participation in the quality-labeling scheme for apple 
and orange juices is, ceteris paribus, associated with a lower price than non-participation.  
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Table 1. Quality Labels and Other Determinants Affecting Fruit Juice Prices in Germany 
Explanatory Variables 
Apple Juice Orange Juice 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant    -0.0467  
  (-1.25) 
   -0.0489*** 
  (-1.29) 
   -0.3089*** 
  (-5.92) 
    0.0145 
   (0.54) 
DLG_LABEL    -0.2084*** 
  (-5.41)  
   -0.0887** 
  (-2.60)  
GOLD     -0.2209***   (-3.97)  
   -0.0841 
  (-1.54) 
SILVER     -0.2206***   (-5.60)  
   -0.1062* 
  (-2.23) 
BRONZE     -0.1484*   (-2.10)  
   -0.0932** 
  (-2.65) 
BRAND     0.1627*** 
   (4.07) 
    0.1639*** 
   (4.13) 
    0.2476*** 
   (6.16) 
    0.2450*** 
   (5.96) 
ln PACKSIZE    -0.3463*** 
  (-8.90) 
   -0.3487*** 
  (-8.85)  
   -0.2110*** 
  (-7.08) 
PACKSIZE b)      -0.2853***   (-6.31)  
CLOUDY     0.1116** 
  (2.82) 
    0.1068** 
   (2.80)   
REGDISTR    0.2412*** 
   (4.01) 
    0.2413*** 
   (3.91)   
LARGECITY    -0.1223** 
  (-2.89) 
   -0.1235** 
  (-2.92)   
UNIFORMPRICE     0.2591*** 
   (6.55) 
    0.2624*** 
   (6.55) 
    0.1319*** 
   (3.40) 
    0.1334*** 
   (3.45) 
ORGANIC     0.1703** 
   (3.27) 
    0.1705*** 
   (3.19) 
    0.3507*** 
   (7.14) 
    0.3578*** 
   (7.40) 
DIRECT_JUICE     0.1038** 
   (2.66) 
    0.1107** 
   (2.86) 
    0.3049*** 
   (6.88) 
    0.3198*** 
   (6.78) 
GLASS       0.0952*    (2.02) 
    0.1291** 
   (2.67) 
BEV_STORE       0.0950*    (2.01)  
𝑅�2     0.531     0.529     0.572     0.574 
F   30.87***   25.24***   31.18***   28.08*** 
n 238 238 182 182 
a) Heteroscedasticity–robust t-values according to White are computed. All variables are explained in the 
text. 
   ***, **, * indicate the 99.9 %-, 99 %-, 95 %-levels of statistical significance for two-sided tests. - b) Model 3 
is a general log-lin model, i.e. the variable PACKSIZE is not converted into logarithms. 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
 
The coefficients of the variable DLG_LABEL are statistically significantly negative in Model 1 
(apple juice) and Model 3 (orange juice), and the coefficients of the disaggregated DLG 
awards GOLD, SILVER, and BRONZE are significantly negative, too. In general, the negative 
price premium is higher for apple juice than for orange juice. Our rationale for the negative 
coefficients is that quality-labeled products are becoming more and more the standard on 
the growing market for discounters in German grocery retailing. Apparently, it is attractive 
for those processors, who do not offer the leading brands, to enter this growing and stable 
market. This even holds if a negative price premium occurs compared to a more individual 
market segment in a hypothetical situation without DLG award. 
It is important to control for a number of other determinants of fruit juice prices. In the 
following interpretation, we concentrate mainly on the results of Models 1 and 3. National 
brands capture significantly higher prices than their counterparts and the price premia of 
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national brands are clearly higher for orange than for apple juice. Organic fruit juice realizes 
a price premium compared to conventional fruit juices, too, that is again significantly higher 
for orange than for apple juice. Whereas the price premium associated with the character-
istic ORGANIC is higher than that for BRAND in the case of orange juice, the two premia are 
nearly identical for both variables in the case of apple juice. A significant price premium is 
earned by direct juice relative to juice from concentrate, both for apple juice and – to a 
larger extent – for orange juice.  
A cost-oriented determinant of fruit juice prices is the package size. A one-percent increase 
in the package size lowers the price of apple juice by 0.35 % (Model 1) and of orange juice by 
0.21 % (Model 4). Fruit juice prices are rising if processors’ market position is so strong that 
their brands are uniformly priced, and more so for apple than for orange juice.  
Some other price determinants are only significant for either apple or orange juice. For 
cloudy apple juices, a price premium can be captured compared to clear apple juices. 
Regionally distributed apple juices also receive a price advantage compared to nationally 
distributed juices and, in general, apple juice is cheaper in the large city than the smaller 
city. A significant positive price difference occurs for orange juice sold in beverage retail mar-
kets compared to other retail stores.  
Table 2 allows additional findings on the magnitude of the impact of the dummy variables. 
As Table 1 contains equations with the logarithm of prices as a dependent variable and many 
dummy variables on the right-hand side, the approach by HALVORSEN and PALMQUIST (1980) is 
applied. With a DLG award, a negative price premium of 18.8 % for apple juice and of 8.5 % 
for orange juice occurs. However, high positive premia are associated with other character-
istics of fruit juice, too. For apple juice, it is 29.6 % if firms can realize uniform pricing for 
their products, 18.6 % for organic apple juice and 17.7 % for national brands. For cloudy and 
direct apple juice, the price premia are higher than 10 %, too. 
Table 2. The Percentage Impact of Quality Labels and Other Characteristics on Fruit Juice Prices in Germanya) 
Explanatory Variables Apple Juice Orange Juice 
DLG_LABEL -18.8 -8.5 
GOLD -19.8 -8.1 
SILVER -19.8 -10.1 
BRONZE -13.8 -8.9 
BRAND +17.7 +28.1 
CLOUDY +11.8  
REGDISTR +27.3  
LARGECITY -11.5  
UNIFORMPRICE +29.6 +14.1 
ORGANIC +18.6 +42.0 
DIRECT_JUICE +10.9 +35.6 
GLASS  +10.0 
BEV_STORE  +10.0 
a)   Computed with the equation by HALVORSEN/PALMQUIST (1980), on the basis of the regression coefficients of 
the dummy variables shown in Table 3. The results are based on Model 1 for apple juice and on Model 3 
for orange juice. The results for the variables GOLD, SILVER and BRONZE are based on Models 2 and 4 
respectively.  
 
In the case of orange juice, some characteristics are associated with even higher percentage 
price premia: organic orange juices gain a premium of 42.0 %, direct juices of 35.6 % and the 
national brands of 28.1 % compared to their counterparts. 
  
Source: Authors‘ computations. 
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5 Conclusions 
The literature on quality assessment and labeling is dominated by contributions in which the 
existence of a price premium is viewed as the major incentive for participation. However, 
there may be other incentives for firms to participate in voluntary quality labeling. 
Discounters in particular offer an increasing share of quality-labeled products. Participation 
in voluntary quality labeling may become a pre-condition for food manufacturers to enter 
the growing market of discount retailers. We called this the market-entry hypothesis and 
analyzed for the German fruit juice market whether participation in the voluntary DLG 
quality labeling is consistent with either the market-entry hypothesis or the traditional price-
premium hypothesis. The analysis confirms for orange and apple juice that the voluntary 
DLG award is associated with a negative price premium. This is only consistent with the 
market-entry hypothesis. 
It seems that the leading juice manufacturers have invested in private quality reputations 
already and realized a price premium for their reputation – as indicated by the coefficient of 
the BRAND variable. Apparently, they do not need to participate in voluntary quality labeling 
such as the DLG label additionally. Manufacturers whose private quality reputation is still 
lower find it more attractive to participate in voluntary DLG labeling and use its collective 
reputation for entering new markets and signaling the quality of their products. 
It might be that the main result of this paper is fruit-juice specific. SCHAMEL (2003), e.g., found 
that DLG quality labeling induced price premia for award-winning wines. What can be 
observed, however, for some other markets like ice cream or beer is that the situation 
seems to be similar to fruit juice. Participants in voluntary labeling on those markets are not 
the leading manufacturers who have already an established high-quality reputation for their 
products. They are rather followers who cannot afford to establish strong national brands as 
indicators of private reputation but have to signal the quality of their products with 
indicators of collective reputation to retailers and consumers. Therefore, it seems necessary 
and interesting to analyze in future research whether the market-entry hypothesis is a much 
more general explanation for participation in quality labeling than for fruit juices alone. 
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Appendix:  Descriptive Statistics on the Data Base: Product Characteristics of Fruit Juices 
in the Samplea) 
Product 
Characteristics 
Apple Juice Orange Juice 
n % n % 
Cloudy  
Clear 
110 
128 
46.2 
53.8 
  
With fruit pulp 
Without fruit pulp 
    12 
170 
  6.6 
93.4 
Direct juice 
Juice from concentrate 
116 
122 
48.7 
51.3 
  23 
159 
12.6 
87.4 
Tetrapak/Elopak 
PET 
Glass 
  94 
  57 
  87 
39.5 
23.9 
36.6 
  78 
  56 
  48 
42.9 
30.8 
26.4 
Discounters 
Supermarkets, large 
department stores, other retailers 
Beverage retail markets 
  33 
 
173 
  32 
13.9 
 
72.7 
13.4 
  29 
 
       128 
         25 
15.9 
 
70.3 
13.7 
Private label 
National brand 
  77 
161 
32.4 
67.6 
  65 
117 
35.7 
64.3 
Regional supply 
Nationwide supply 
  68 
170 
28.6 
71.4 
  31 
151 
17.0 
83.0 
Organic production 
Conventional juices 
  26 
212 
10.9 
89.1 
  15 
167 
  8.2 
91.8 
No DLG award 
With DLG award 
150 
  88 
63.0 
37.0 
125 
  57 
68.7 
31.3 
Gold 
Silver 
Bronze 
  35 
  38 
  15 
14.7 
16.0 
  6.3 
  17 
  28 
  12 
  9.3 
15.4 
  6.6 
Package with DLG label 
Package with any label 
  36 
  49 
15.1 
20.6 
  20 
  30 
11.0 
16.5 
a) The total sample consists of 238 apple juices and 182 orange juices. 
Source: Own presentation and computations. 
 
